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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
NICHOLAS LAMARR,

)

Plaintiff/Appellant,
vs.
UTAH STATE DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION and SALT
LAKE CITY,
Defendant/Appellees.

)
)
)
)
)
)

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
Case No. 900574
Category 16

)

Defendant/Appellee, Salt Lake City ("the City"), pursuant to
Rule 24(b) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, submits the
following Brief.
JURISDICTION
The City agrees with the jurisdiction statement provided by
Lamarr.

This Court has jurisdiction to decide this appeal

pursuant to §78-2-2(3)(j), Utah Code Annotated.
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
The City contends that the following issues are presented to
this Court for review:
1.

Does the City have any duty to Lamarr concerning either

transients under the North Temple overpass of the overpass.
2.

Was summary judgment on the issue of proximate causation

appropriate given the hyperattenuated causal chain claimed by
Lamarr?
3.

Does the existence of a population of transients under a

State owned and maintained overpass create a "defective, unsafe

or dangerous condition" of the State highway above for which
governmental immunity of the City been waived?
4.

Is the City immune from Lamarr's action under the

"discretionary function" rule?
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL AND
STATUTORY AUTHORITY
The interpretation of the following statutory provisions is
determinative of certain issues on appeal.

These statutes are

excerpted and set out in the addendum to this Brief pursuant to
Rule 24(f) (2) URAP.
§27-14-2 Utah Code Annotated (1987)
§27-14-4 Utah Code Annotated (1987)
§63-30-4 Utah Code Annotated (1987)
§63-30-8 Utah Code Annotated (1987)
§63-30-9 Utah Code Annotated (1987)
§63-30-10 Utah Code Annotated (1987).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case.

This is a negligence action brought

by Lamarr against the City and the Utah State Department of
Transportation ("UDOT") alleging that the City and UDOT were
negligent in failing to control transients under the North Temple
overpass which caused Lamarr to illegally walk in the roadway
over the overpass which caused another car to hit another car
which hit and injured Lamarr.
B.

Course of Proceedings.

After discovery was conducted

the City and UDOT moved for summary judgment.

After briefing and

oral argument the trial court granted summary judgment in favor
2

of the City and UDOT, concluding that:
1.

Defendant Salt Lake City owed no general duty to

the plaintiff for the construction, maintenance and signing
of the North Temple overpass.
2.

The defendant Salt Lake City owed no private duty

to the plaintiff for controlling the transient population
under the North Temple overpass;
3.

The conduct of the defendants Salt Lake City and

UDOT was not a proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries;
4.

Any duty of the defendant Salt Lake City to control

the transient population under the North Temple overpass is
an immune discretionary function under Utah Code Ann. §6330-10(a); and
5.

The construction, maintenance and signing of the

North Temple overpass is not an immune discretionary
function under Utah Code Ann. §63-30-10(a).
(See Order of Dismissal, R. 287-290, attached as Appendix B to
the Appellant's Brief.)
C.

Statement of Facts.

The factual statement submitted in the Appellant's brief is
correct as far as it goes.

However, certain key facts have been

omitted and one key fact should be reemphasized.
1.
highway.
2.

North Temple, and the North Temple overpass, is a State
§27-12-49.1, Utah Code Annotated.
The accident in which Lamarr was injured involved one

car, driven by a friend or relative of Lamarr's, improperly
3

turning into another car which, in turn, struck Lamarr.
3.

(R. 3,)

A walkway or sidewalk existed providing pedestrian

access between the two ends of the overpass and Lamarr knew of
this alternative but decided not to use it.

(R. 3.)

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
1.

An essential element of a negligence case is the

existence of a duty owed by the plaintiff to the defendant.

This

Court has previously held that in an action against a
governmental entity the plaintiff must show not just a "general
duty" to perform an act for the benefit of the public but,
instead, a "special duty" on behalf of the governmental entity to
the injured party.

See Ferree v. State of Utah, 784 P.2d 149

(Utah 1989).
Lamarr has failed to establish this "special duty" and, in
fact, has failed to establish any duty whatsoever on behalf of
the City concerning the State owned North Temple overpass.

The

State statute allowing the City to post pedestrian signs along
State highways has not created a mandatory duty to do so.
Further, no duty was created by any knowledge of the City of any
defective condition because the City never had any notice that
the transients under the overpass were causing persons to
illegally walk in the roadway over the overpass.
2.

As a matter of law, Lamarr has failed to establish a

proximate causal relationship.

In a Rube Goldberg attempt to

show causation, Lamarr's Brief ignores the two controlling Utah
cases concerning the relationship between proximate causation and
4

intervening causes. Mitchell v. Pearson Enterprises/ 697 P. 2d
240 (Utah 1985) and Williams v. Melbv, 699 P.2d 723 (Utah 1985)
establish that summary judgment is proper, unless the plaintiff
establishes a direct causal relationship between the defendant's
alleged negligence and the injury.

Further, Mitchell and

Williams hold that an intervening act of negligence will break
the chain of causation if the intervening act is not
"foreseeable".

Here, Lamarr alleges that the negligence of the

City in failing to control the transients caused Lamarr to
illegally walk in the roadway of the North Temple overpass which
caused the driver of a car looking for Lamarr to swerve into
another car which, finally, hit and injured Lamarr.

This

hyperattenuated causal chain is completely unforeseeable as a
matter of law.
3.

Transients under the North Temple overpass are not a

"defective" condition of the State owned overpass waiving the
City's immunity.

The plain language of §63-30-8, U.C.A., does

not include transients within the ambit of a "dangerous or
defective" condition which has been held to mean such things as
defective manhole covers, obstructions in the roadway, icy roads
and similar physical conditions of the roadway itself.
4.

Finally, the City is immune from any claims under the

"discretionary function" doctrine.

Decisions concerning the

management of the City's transient population and whether or not
the City chooses to supplement the State's signage of pedestrian
ways adjacent to State highways meet the tests of being a
5

"policy" decision established by this Court in Rocky Mountain
Thrift Stores, et al. v. Salt Lake City, et al., 784 P.2d 459
(Utah 1989).

This Court will not second guess the City in its

policy decisions where the plaintiff's bare allegation is that
the City and UDOT should have "better" protected him from the
transient population under the overpass.

See, Duncan v. Union

Pacific Railroad Company, 790 P.2d 595 (Utah App. 1990).
ARGUMENT
INTRODUCTION
Lamarr's claim in this case is the apotheosis of the
"creativity" endemic to the personal injury plaintiff's bar.

The

first rule of any plaintiff's negligence case is to find a chain
of causation, no matter how bizarrely tenuous, to a deep pocket.
If the deep pocket happens to be a governmental entity, the
plaintiffs then attempt superhuman leaps of illogic to show that
the governmental entity has a non-delegable, non-immune duty to
the world at large and every particular individual in it to make
sure that no one gets hurt even through their own fault or random
chance.
On appeal Lamarr makes essentially four claims:
1.

That Lamarr has no requirement whatsoever to

establish any duty on behalf of the City towards the
plaintiff;
2.

That no matter how fanciful or attenuated the

claimed chain of causation is, the issue of causation should
always get to a jury.
6

3.

That the existence of transients under a State

highway overpass is somehow a "dangerous condition of a
highway" and thus immunity has been waived by the City; and
4.

That this "dangerous condition" waiver also waives

all other immunities which the City may have.
The City will deal with these four issues seriatim.
POINT I
LAMARR HAS FAILED TO ESTABLISH ANY "DUTY" ON
BEHALF OF THE CITY TOWARDS LAMARR.
Lamarr's attempt to mislead this Court concerning the
relationship between the "special duty" doctrine and the issue of
governmental immunity demonstrates a fatal misreading of this
Court's clear decisions.

Lamarr would have this Court believe

that the issue of immunity should be addressed first and, if
immunity is found to be waived, there would be no requirement for
Lamarr to show any duty whatsoever owed by the City to Lamarr.
Of course, this Court has specifically decided the issue
exactly the reverse.

In Ferree v. State of Utah, 784 P.2d 149

(Utah 1989), this Court considered whether a wrongful death
action could be brought against corrections officials by the
family of a victim killed by an inmate on weekend release.

This

Court recognized in Ferree that sovereign immunity "is an
affirmative defense and conceptually arises subsequent to the
question of whether there is tort liability in the first
instance."

Ferree, supra at 153.

The Court went on to explain

that this order of analysis would allow courts to avoid "having
to make difficult decisions with respect to the difficult
7

discretionary exception doctrine in sovereign immunity cases."
Id.

This Court further stated that "[djeciding an immunity

question first may lead to unwarranted assumptions and confusion
about undecided duty problems."

Id.

It is thus clear that the trial court's reasoning in
considering the issue of "special duty" was correct.
In Ferree this Court also stated the Hornbook principles of
law governing the issue of duty which control this case.

This

Court held:
To establish negligence or gross negligence, a
plaintiff must first establish a duty of care owed by
the defendant to the plaintiff. Beach v. University of
Utah, 726 P.2d 413, 415 (Utah 1986); Weber ex rel.
Weber v. Springville City, 725 P.2d 1360, 1363 (Utah
1986); Prosser & Keeton on the Law of Torts §30, at 164
(W. Keeton 5th Ed. 1984). Duty is "a question of
whether the defendant is under any obligation for the
benefit of a particular plaintiff. . . . "
Prosser &
Keeton, supra §53, at 356-57. The issue of whether a
duty exists is entirely a question of law to be
determined by the Court. Weber, 7 25 P.2d at 136 3;
Prosser & Keeton, supra, §37 at 236.
For a governmental agency and its agents to be liable
for negligently caused injury suffered by a member of
the public, the plaintiff must show a breach of a duty
owed him as an individual, not merely the breach of an
obligation owed to the general public at large by the
governmental official. Obray v. Malmberg, 26 Utah 2d
17, 19, 484 P.2d 160, 162 (1971) [ ].
Ferree, supra at 151 (emphasis added).
It is difficult to imagine a clearer statement of law
requiring Lamarr in this case to show a "special duty" as a
condition precedent to any negligence allegation.

Lamarr has, by

consistently denying any requirement of showing a "special duty"
relationship, established that he is claiming no such special
8

duty exists in this case.

Further, no such special duty could

even be alleged.
Less than one month after deciding Ferree this Court
considered another case involving the "essential element of a
negligence claim [of] a duty owed by the defendant to the
plaintiff."

Owens v. Garfield, 784 P.2d 1187, 1189 (Utah 1989).

In Owens, as here, the allegation was that a governmental entity
owed a duty to the plaintiff to control the conduct of third
persons.

This Court noted that common law traditionally imposes

no such duty except under two limited circumstances.

The

governmental entity would have a duty to control the activities
of the third persons only if:

(a) a special relationship existed

between the governmental entity and the third person which
imposed a duty upon the entity to control the third person's
conduct, or (b) a special relationship existed between the entity
and the plaintiff which gives to the plaintiff a right of
protection.

See Owens, supra at 1189, citing Hale v. Allstate

Ins. Co., 639 P.2d 203, 205 (Utah 1981) (quoting Restatement (2d)
of Torts, §315 (1964)).
In the instant case, as in Owens, "it is difficult to
conceive, and [the plaintiffs have not attempted] to construct,
an argument that [the City] had a sufficiently close relationship
in a legal sense with [the transients or the other two drivers]
to give rise to a duty to control [their] activities."
supra at 1189.

Owens,

Further, Lamarr has failed to even argue for the

existence of a special relationship between the City and Lamarr
9

giving Lamarr some special right of protection greater than that
afforded to the public at large.

If such a duty of protection

could not be found under the egregious factual situation and
statutory scheme of protection in Owens then surely none can be
found here.1
Further, as a matter of law, the City had no legal duty to
construct pedestrian safety devices adjacent to the North Temple
overpass.

At most, §27-14-4, U.C.A. relied upon by Lamarr, says

that the City "may" construct such devices in cooperation with
UDOT.

This grant of permission cannot be transformed by the

plaintiffs into an actionable "duty" protecting either Lamarr
individually or the public generally.

A "duty" forming the basis

of a negligence action involves a mandatory obligation running
between parties.

See Ferree, supra and Owens, supra.

The word "may" in §27-14-4, U.C.A. imposes no such mandatory
obligation.

In Grant v. Utah State Land Board, 26 Utah 2d 100,

485 P.2d 1035, 1037 (1971) this Court considered what the word
"may" means in a legislative context.

This Court began its

analysis with the basic rule of statutory construction which
assumes that the legislature used each term of a statute
advisedly and that each term should be given an interpretation in
accord with their usually accepted meanings unless the context
Moreover, the "transients" are not without constitutional
rights and cannot be unilaterally herded by the City like so many
undesirable cattle to whatever location the City may choose.
Absent the commission of some demonstrable criminal activity the
individuals which Lamarr characterizes as "transients" have as
much right as Lamarr to be congregating or standing under the
North Temple overpass.
10

otherwise requires.

While recognizing certain very limited

exceptions, this Court held that "the word 'may' in its most
usual meaning does not import certainty, but uncertainty."
(Footnotes omitted.)

Id.

This Court further noted that if the

legislature had intended the statutory language to be an absolute
or mandatory requirement then the legislature could just as
easily have used the word "shall" or "must".

In another case,

this Court has held that use of the word "may" implies a
mandatory obligation only if it appears that the intent of the
legislature was to impose a duty on the governmental entity.
Board of Education of the Granite School District v. Salt Lake
County, 659 P.2d 1030, 1035 (Utah 1983).
If the Court finds that the permissive "may" in §27-14-4,
U.C.A. creates a mandatory "duty", the Court will effectively be
requiring Salt Lake City and every other city, town or county
with a State highway within its borders to "construct and
maintain curb, gutters, sidewalks and pedestrian safety devices."
The financial and logistical impact of such a decision would be
unfathomable.2
Lamarr has also completely failed to establish another
essential element of any "duty" which may allegedly be owed by
the City.

A basic rule of negligence law is that where the

alleged negligence results from a dangerous or defective

2

Should this Court construe the "may" in §27-14-4, U.C.A.,
to be permissive rather than mandatory, the "discretionary
function" governmental immunity of §63-30-10(a), U.C.A. would
automatically apply. See Point IV below.
11

condition it must be shown that the property owner had notice of
this dangerous condition.

Clover v. Snowbird Ski Resort,

P. 2d

, 155 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 8 (Utah 1991); Peats v. Commercial
Security Bank, 746 P.2d 1191 (Utah App. 1987).

In the instant

case, Lamarr has argued only that the City knew of the existence
of the transients under the overpass.

The mere presence of a

certain class of people does not per se create a "dangerous
condition" under the overpass.

It certainly does not imply that

the City had notice that the transients were creating a defective
condition on the State owned overpass by forcing people to
illegally walk in the roadway.

(See footnote 1 above.)

Lamarr has failed to demonstrate the essential "duty"
element of negligence claim.

The City had no special duty to

Lamarr to control the transients, no duty whatsoever to anyone to
post supplementary on a State highway and no notice, either
actual or constructive, of the existence of any dangerous
condition.
reached.

Thus, the issue of immunity never needs to be

Absent a duty there can be no negligence liability.
POINT II
AS A MATTER OF LAW LAMARR HAS FAILED TO
ESTABLISH A PROXIMATE CAUSAL RELATIONSHIP.

Lamarr's Brief completely fails to cite the two controlling
cases in Utah explaining the relationship between the various
possible causes of an injury and establishing the standard for
determining when summary judgment is appropriate where the chain
of proximate cause was broken by an independent intervening act.
Mitchell v. Pearson Enterprises, 697 P.2d 240 (Utah 1985) and
12

Williams v. Melby, 699 P.2d 723 (Utah 1985).

Mitchell involved a

wrongful death action against a hotel wherein the plaintiff
claimed that the hotel's negligent lack of reasonable security
caused the murder of the plaintiff's husband.

This Court

reiterated the "standard definition" of proximate cause:
[T]hat cause which, in natural and continuous sequence,
(unbroken by an efficient intervening cause), produces
the injury and without which the result would not have
occurred. It is the efficient cause - the one that
necessarily sets in operation the factors that
accomplish the injury.
Mitchell, supra at 245, citing State v. Lawson, 668 P.2d 479, 482
and n. 3 (Utah 1984) .
This Court noted that it was the plaintiff's burden to show
that the defendant's alleged negligence was a substantial
causative factor in the plaintiff's death.

Adopting the

Restatement (Second) of Torts analysis from §433(B), this Court
indicated that the chain of proximate causation might not be
broken by an alleged intervening negligent act of another person
only

if the intervening act was, itself, "foreseeable" as a

result of the defendant's negligence.

Mitchell, supra at 246.

One month later, in Williams, this Court specifically
reiterated its adoption of the Restatement (2d) of Torts §447
rule regarding the foreseeability of the intervening or
superseding direct cause of harm.

The Restatement rule is

phrased as a three part alternative.

The intervening act of a

third person does not supersede the defendant's negligence only
if:

(a) the defendant, at the time of his negligence, should

have realized that a third person might act negligently, or (b) a
13

reasonable man in the place of the defendant, knowing the
situation existing when the act of the third person was done,
would not regard it as highly extraordinary that the third party
had so acted; or (c) the intervening negligent act is a normal
consequence of a situation created by the defendant's conduct and
the manner in which the intervening act is done is not
extraordinarily negligent.
In considering this issue of intervening causation in the
context of summary judgment we must return again to Mitchell
where this Court noted that while, ordinarily, M[t]he issue of
proximate cause is a matter to be submitted to the jury for its
determination . . .

in appropriate circumstances summary judgment

may be granted on the issue of proximate cause."
at 245 (footnotes omitted).

Mitchell, supra

In Mitchell, because of the lack of

any evidence linking Mitchell's death with the hotel's allegedly
inadequate security, this Court held that the chain of causation
"would be totally speculative."

Mitchell, supra at 245, quoting

Staheli v. Farmersf Cooperative of Southern Utah, 655 P.2d 680,
684 (Utah 1982).

This Court in Mitchell held "[w]hen the

proximate cause of an injury is left to speculation, the claim
fails as a matter of law."
The tests of Mitchell and Williams for summary judgment on
the issue of proximate causation are met here.

As a matter of

law the City could not foresee that Lamarr would react to the
presence of the transients in the area of the safe walkway by
walking at night illegally in the roadway of a major street and
14

would be struck by a car which had been hit by another car which
was looking for Lamarr.

This chain of events is, if anything,

even more bizarre than the classic first year torts case of
Palsgraf v. Long Island Railway Company, 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E.
99 (1928).

The Court will recall that in Palsgraf employees of

the railroad were attempting to assist a late arriving passenger
onto the train.

These employees knocked a case of fireworks onto

the train tracks which exploded.

The shock wave of this

explosion, in turn, knocked a set of scales over on to the
plaintiff.
Neither in Palsgraf nor here could the City have reasonably
foreseen that this bizarre chain of occurrences might result in
some injury to the plaintiff.

Only Rube Goldberg could have

foreseen the extraordinarily abnormal consequence of a driver
looking for a pedestrian spotting him walking illegally in the
roadway of an overpass because of some allegedly negligent
condition below the overpass and then pulling into another car
which eventually struck Lamarr.

As a matter of law, the causal

chain between the City's alleged failure to control the
transients below the North Temple overpass and the automobile
accident which injured Lamarr is too attenuated to be the basis
of any liability.
POINT III
TRANSIENTS UNDER THE NORTH TEMPLE OVERPASS
ARE NOT A "DEFECTIVE CONDITION" FOR WHICH
IMMUNITY HAS BEEN WAIVED.
The existence of transients under the North Temple overpass
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is not a "defective, unsafe, or dangerous condition of any
highway" for which governmental immunity has been waived.
Statutes such as §63-30-8, U.C.A., which provides a limited
immunity waiver for injuries caused by defective, unsafe or
dangerous highways, have been held, in Utah and throughout the
west, to mean physical conditions which make the roadway itself
dangerous.

These include:

defective manhole covers, Wilson v.

Salt Lake City, 13 Utah 2d 234, 371 P.2d 644 (1962); construction
dirt piles left in a street, Nyman v. Cedar City, 12 Utah 2d 45,
361 P.2d 1114 (1961); boulders from the road cut falling onto
cars, Schlitters v. State, 787 P.2d 656 (Colo.App. 1989); the
placement of obstructions in a roadway, Gallagher v. Albuquerque
Metro Aroyo Flood Control Authority, 563 P.2d 103 (N.M.App.
1977); improperly designed width of highway shoulders, Terranella
v. City and County of Honolulu, 479 P.2d 210 (Hawaii 1971);
insufficient maintenance during the winter, State v. Abbott, 498
P.2d 712 (Alaska 1972); icy roads, Walker v. Coconino County, 473
P.2d 472 (Ariz.App. 1970); and other similar defects.

The City

has found no case, and Lamarr has cited none, where human
conditions under an overpass have been held to make the overpass
itself defective.
Moreover, §63-30-8 provides that immunity is waived only if
the "defective conditions" caused the injury.

There is

absolutely no causal relationship between the transients below
the overpass and the accident on top of the overpass.

The

transients had nothing to do with causing the multiple car
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accident on the overpass.

Lamarr has made absolutely no

allegation that the overpass itself was defective in a way that
caused the accident.

Thus even if the transients under the

overpass were a "defective condition", immunity is still
maintained because the "defective condition" did not cause the
injury.
POINT IV
THE CITY IS IMMUNE FROM THIS ACTION UNDER THE
"DISCRETIONARY FUNCTION" ANALYSIS.
Lamarr's Brief claims that §27-14-4(2), U.C.A., which allows
cities to construct sidewalks and pedestrian safety devices
adjacent to State highways creates a non-discretionary duty on
the City to place pedestrian safety devices adjacent to every
State highway.

As noted in Point I above, the use of the word

"may" in §27-14-4(2), virtually by definition, triggers the
"discretionary function" preservation of immunity in §63-3010(l)(a), U.C.A.

See Grant, supra.

In Rocky Mountain Thrift Stores, et al. v. Salt Lake City,
et a h , 784 P. 2d 459 (Utah 1989), this Court reiterated the four
tests for determining "discretionary function" immunity.

Citing

Little v. Utah State Division of Family Services, 667 P.2d 49, 51
(Utah 1983), this Court set out the following test:
(1) Does the challenged act, omission, or decision
necessarily involve a basic governmental policy,
program, or objective?
(2) Is the questioned act, omission, or decision
essential to the realization or accomplishment of that
policy, program, or objective as opposed to one which
would not change the course or direction of the policy,
program, or objective?
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(3) Does the act, omission, or decision require the
exercise of basic policy evaluation, judgment, and
expertise on the part of the governmental agency
involved?
(4) Does
requisite
authority
omission,

the governmental agency involved possess the
constitutional, statutory, or lawful
and duty to do or make the challenged act,
or decision?

Rocky Mountain Thrift Stores, supra at 463.
Starting with the test number four, §27-14-4(2) establishes
that the City has been permitted the authority to construct
pedestrian safety devices adjacent to State highways.

Concerning

test number one, the "basic governmental policy" question, this
is met by the "purpose" statement in §27-14-2, U.C.A. which
recognizes that "adequate sidewalks and pedestrian safety devices
are essential to the general welfare of the citizens of the
state."
Concerning test number two, "essential to the realization of
the policy", the City's decisions as to where or where not to
supplement the State's activities concerning State roads is
clearly essential to the realization of the safety policy.
Finally, concerning test number three, the "exercise of basic
policy evaluation or judgment", unless this Court intends to
mandate the construction of fully protected and signed pedestrian
crossings or sidewalks adjacent to all State highways in every
city, town and county, the actual placement of such sidewalks and
devices clearly lies within the expertise and judgment of the
City.
As noted in Duncan v. Union Pacific Railroad Company, 79 0
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P.2d 595, 601 (Utah App. 1990):
Highway maintenance and improvement are predominately
fiscal matters. Every highway could probably be made
safer by further expenditures, but we will not hold
fthe governmental entity] negligent for having to
strike a difficult balance between the need for greater
safety and the burden of funding improvements. As we
pointed out in fGleave v. Denver & Rio Grande Western
Railroad Company, 749 P.2d 660 (Utah 1988)], and as
UDOT emphasizes here, there are hundreds of
unelectrified railroad crossings in Utah, and it is not
fiscally possible to equip them all with the best
possible means of assuring traffic safety. Rather,
UDOT prioritizes the crossings and allocated the
limited funds available for crossing improvements. The
role of the judiciary in that prioritization and
allocation process is strictly limited. In a case
seeking judicial review of that administrative process,
we would exercise our reviewing function with deference
to the administrative agency under the "arbitrary and
capricious" standard. However, in a tort action such
as this, the deference to a governmental function is
absolute unless waived, and we do not review it at all
under tort principles.
(Empha sis added.)
The instant case is also analogous to Duncan in another
regard.

As the Court of Appeals noted in Duncan, the plaintiff's

allegation was not that there was no attempt to control traffic
as it approached the railroad.

Rather, the plaintiff asserted

that UDOT should have used a "better" means of warning traffic.
Duncan, supra at 601.

The Court of Appeals declined to second-

guess UDOT beyond any requirement for minimal warning and control
of traffic.
In the instant case, Lamarr's allegations are subject to the
same weakness.

There is no dispute that alternative routings

were available for pedestrians to traverse the distance spanned
by the North Temple overpass.

Stairs and a ground level walkway
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were taken by Lamarr while walking in one direction but shunned
on the return trip.

Thus, the very types of pedestrian access

suggested by §27-14-4(2) were, in fact, in place.

Lamarr only

seeks to have this Court mandate some "better" pedestrian access.
As in Duncan, this Court should decline to second guess the
discretionary determination of the City and UDOT in determining
the precise method chosen to allow pedestrian travel.
The same "discretionary function" analysis also applies to
the City's management of the transient population within the City
whether that management is characterized as a "social welfare" or
a "police" problem.

Surely, managing and/or caring for the

transient population is a discretionary "basic governmental
policy" concerning the allocation of financial and human
resources involving political, philosophical and even
constitutional concerns.

The decisions of the police or other

agencies charged with meeting these goals and objectives are
essential to the realization of the policy.

Further, the

transient management policy involves the exercise of basic policy
evaluation, judgment and expertise in determining its scope,
methods, expenditures, timing, etc.
This Court may also want to reconsider and broaden its test
for determining whether an act is "discretionary" and, therefore,
immune in light of a recent United States Supreme Court decision
construing the analogous "discretionary function" exemption under
the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §2680(a).
States v. Gaubert,

U.S.

In United

, 59 L.W. 4244 (No. 89-1793, March
20

26, 1991), the United States Supreme Court held that the
"discretionary function" exception retained sovereign immunity
for the United States for matters which might be considered of a
"routine or frequent nature" if they involved the exercise of
"choice and judgment."

This interpretation by the United States

Supreme Court is broader than the Rocky Mountain Thrift/Little
four-part analysis.
The United States Supreme Court's holding in Gaubert
recognizes that "discretion" is exercised and should be protected
at many functional levels and not just at the upper levels of
ultimate policy.

While the City believes the decisions made in

the instant case concerning the City's supplementation of the
signage on the State highway or the management of the transient
population are clearly discretionary even under Rocky Mountain
Thrift Stores and Little they would be even more obviously immune
under Gaubert.
CONCLUSION

Lamarr has ignored this Court's clear requirement that he
must establish a "special duty" owed by the City to him as the
sine qua non of his negligence case.
exist here.

No such duty can possibly

The City's management of its transient population is

not specially targeted for the protection of Lamarr.

Further,

the mere grant of permission to the City to construct
supplemental pedestrian safety devices on State highways does not
mandate their installation either generally or specifically for
21

the protection of Lamarr.
Lamarr's alleged chain of a causal relationship in this case
can be described as anything but proximate.

The thigh bone may

be connected to the hip bone, and for want of a nail a horse may
have been lost, but the transients under the overpass had
absolutely nothing to do with Lamarr illegally walking in the
roadway being hit by one car which was hit by another car.
Further, even if Lamarr had established any duty or
proximate causal relationship, Lamarr has failed to establish
that the existence of transients under the North Temple overpass
is a "defective condition" of a highway for which immunity has
been waived.

Finally, any actions of the City concerning

supplementary signage or transient management are clearly within
this Court's definition of a "discretionary function" and are
thus immune from action.
Accordingly, the summary judgment granted below should be
affirmed.
DATED this

13*

day of May, 1991.

BRl^Cfi R. BAIRD
Assistant City Attorney
Attorney for Salt Lake City
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ADDENDUM

27-14-2

HIGHWAYS
COLLATERAL REFERENCES

Am. JUT. 2d. — 39 Am. Jur. 2d Highways,
Streets, and Bndges § 75.
C.J.S. — 40 C J.S. Highways §§ 175,176; 64
CJ.S. Municipal Corporations § 1662.

Key Numbers. — Highways *» 973/4, 99V4;
Municipal Corporations «=» 646.

27-14-2. Purpose.
The legislature recognizes that adequate sidewalks and pedestrian safetydevices are essential to the general welfare of the citizens of the state. It is the
opinion of the legislature that existing sidewalks within the state, especially
in the most populated areas, are not adequate to service the walking public
with a result of creating unnecessary hazards to pedestrian and vehicular
traffic. It is the intent of this act to provide a means whereby a portion of the
funds received by the counties and participating cities as B and C road funds
may be used for the construction of curbs, gutters, sidewalks and pedestrian
safety devices pursuant to the guidelines set forth in this act. The legislature
deems it to be in the best interest of the state if pedestrian safety construction
is to be performed on state highways that it be performed under the direction
of the counties and participating cities pursuant to rules and regulations of
the state Department of Transportation developed in cooperation with the
counties and participating cities. It is the further intention of the legislature
that the funds permitted to be expended pursuant to this act be deemed additional to funds normally used by counties and participating cities for sidewalk
construction and shall not be used in substitution for local sidewalk construction funds.
History: C. 1953, 27-14-2, enacted by L.
1975 (1st S.S.), ch. 3, § 2.

Meaning of "this act." — See note under
§ 27-14-1.

27-14-3. Definitions.
As used in this act:
(1) "Construction" means the function of constructing or reconstructing
a sidewalk with or without curb and gutter and shall include land acquisition, engineering or inspection and may be more fully defined by the
rules and regulations of the Department of Transportation.
(2) 'Tarticipating city" means any city having at least third class status.
(3) "Curb and gutter" means the area between the roadway and sidewalk designed for water runoff and safety of pedestrian and vehicular
traffic.
(4) "Pedestrian safety devices" means any device or method designed to
foster the safety of pedestrian traffic.
History: C. 1953, 27-14-3, enacted by L.
1975 (1st S.S.), ch. 3, § 1.

Meaning of "this act." — See note under
§ 27-14-1.
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27-14-4. Designated county and city sidewalks — Construction on easements granted by transportation department
(1) All sidewalks, including curbs and gutters within the unincorporated
areas of a county and within nonparticipating cities or towns situated within
the county, shall be designated county sidewalks. All sidewalks within participating cities shall be designated city sidewalks.
(2) Notwithstanding any other provision of law counties and participating
cities may construct and maintain curbs, gutters, sidewalks and pedestrian
safety devices adjacent to the traveled portion of state highways upon easements that may be granted by the state Department of Transportation. The
state Department of Transportation shall cooperate with counties and participating cities to accomplish pedestrian safety construction and maintenance.
History: C. 1963, 27-14-4, enacted by L.
1975 (1st S.S.), ch. 3, § 1.

Cross-References.— Department of Transportation, Chapter 49 of Title 63.

27-14-5. Funding priorities by county and city officials —
Factors.
(1) The county commissioners of the counties and the governing officials of
participating cities may establish funding priorities relating to construction of
curbs, gutters, sidewalks or other pedestrian safety construction, with funds
permitted to be expended by this act, based on factors including, but not
limited to:
(a) existing usable rights-of-way;
(b) auto-pedestrian accident experience;
(c) average daily automobile traffic;
(d) average daily pedestrian traffic;
(e) average daily school age pedestrian traffic; and
(f) speed of automobile traffic.
(2) All construction performed pursuant to this act shall be barrier free to
wheelchairs at crosswalks and intersections.
History: C. 1953, 27-14-5, enacted by L.
1975 (1st S.S.), ch. 3, § 1.

Meaning of "this act." — See note under
§ 27-14-1.

27-14-6. Pedestrian safety to be considered in highway
planning.
Pedestrian safety considerations shall be included in all state highway engineering and planning where pedestrian traffic would be a significant factor on
all projects within the state or any of its political subdivisions.
History: C. 1953, 27-14-fl, enacted by L.
1975 (1st S.S.), ch. 3, § L
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Standiford v. Salt Lake City Corp., 605 P.2d
1230 (Utah 1980).
Test for determining governmental immunity is whether the activity under consideration is of such a unique nature that it can
only be performed by a governmental agency,
referring not to what government may do but
to what government alone must do, or that it is
essential to the core of governmental activity,
referring to those activities not unique in
themselves but essential to the performance of
those activities that are uniquely governmen-

tal. Johnson v. Salt Lake City Corp., 629 R2d.
432 (Utah 1981).
Water system.
Where city operated water system as a com*
mercial venture in a proprietary capacity, ife
was liable for injuries allegedly suffered by
plaintiff when she stepped on loose water
meter lid whether the meter was on plaintiffs,
property or in the street. Gordon v. Provo City*
15 Utah 2d 287, 391 P.2d 430 (1964).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Journal of Contemporary Law. — Defining Governmental Function Under the Utah
Governmental Immunity Act, 9 J. Contemp. L.
193 (1983).
Journal of Energy Law and Policy. —
Comment, The Only Way to Manage a Desert:
Utah's Liability Immunity for Flood Control, 8
J. Energy L. & Pol'y 95 (1987).
A.L.R. — Liability of municipality for personal injury or death under mob violence or
anti-lynchmg statutes, 26 A.L.R.3d 1142.
Liability of municipality for property damage under mob violence statutes, 26 A.L.R.3d
1198.
Modern status of rule excusing governmental unit from tort liability on theory that only
general, not particular, duty was owed under
circumstances, 38 A.L.R.4th 1194.
Governmental tort liability for failure to provide police protection to specifically threatened
crime victim, 46 A.L.R.4th 948.
Failure to restrain drunk driver as ground of
liability of state or local governmental unit or
officer, 48 A.L.R.4th 287.
Governmental liability for failure to post
highway deer crossing warning signs, 59
A.L.R.4th 1217.

State's liability for personal injuries from
criminal attack in state park, 59 A.L.R.4th
1236.
Tort liability of public authority for failure
to remove parentally abused or neglected children from parents' custody, 60 A.L.R.4th 942:
Tort liability of college or university for u>
jury suffered by student as a result of own or
fellow student's intoxication, 62 A.L.R.4th 81*
Medical malpractice: hospital's liability for
injury allegedly caused by failure to have pros*erly qualified staff, 62 A.L.R.4th 692.
Liability to one struck by golf club, 631
A.L.R.4th 221.
Tort liability of college, university, fraterj
nity, or sorority for injury or death of member
or prospective member by hazing or initiatioS
activity, 68 A.L.R.4th 228.
Governmental liability for negligence in licensing, regulating, or supervising private
day-care home in which child is injured, 6&*
A.L.R.4th 266.
Construction and application of Federal Tort
Claims Act provision excepting from coverage*
claims arising out of assault and battery (28
USCS § 2680(h)), 88 A.L.R. Fed. 7.

63-30-4. Act provisions not construed as admission or denial of liability — Effect of waiver of immunity —
Exclusive remedy — Joinder of employee — Limitations on personal liability.
(1) Nothing contained in this chapter, unless specifically provided, shall M
construed as an admission or denial of liability or responsibility insofar aa
governmental entities or their employees are concerned. If immunity from
suit is waived by this chapter, consent to be sued is granted and liability of tlw
entity shall be determined as if the entity were a private person.
(2) Nothing in this chapter shall be construed as adversely affecting anH
immunity from suit which a governmental entity or employee may otherwSa
assert under state or federal law.
(3) The remedy against a governmental entity or its employee for an injuiji
caused by an act or omission which occurs during the performance of sucfc
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oyee's duties, within the scope of employment, or under color of authority
ter the effective date of this act, exclusive of any other civil action or
eding by reason of the same subject matter against the employee or the
e of the employee whose act or omission gave rise to the claim, unless the
oyee acted or failed to act through fraud or malice.
An employee may be joined in an action against a governmental entity
representative capacity if the act or omission complained of is one for
!i the governmental entity may be liable, but no employee may be held
>nally liable for acts or omissions occurring during the performance of the
oyee's duties, within the scope of employment or under color of authority,
\s it is established that the employee acted or failed to act due to fraud or
:e.
tory: L. 1965, ch. 139, § 4; 1978, ch. 27,
983, ch. 129, § 3.
ss-References. — Compromise and setit, § 63-30-18.

Payment of medical and similar expenses
not admissible to prove liability for injury,
Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 409.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Personal liability.
This section precludes personal liability of a
governmental employee for acts or omissions
occurring during the performance of his duties,
unless the employee acted or failed to act
through gross negligence, fraud or malice.
Madsen v. Borthick, 658 P.2d 627 (Utah 1983)
(decided prior to 1983 amendment).
This section barred negligence claims
against individual police officers, where plaintiff did not allege that the officers acted with
fraud or malice in beating him after an alleged
wrongful arrest. Maddocks v. Salt Lake City
Corp., 740 P.2d 1337 (Utah 1987).

ANALYSIS

omental immunity.
emmental function.
d sued in representative capacity.
lal liability.
licability of section.
ledy for wrongful act.
Q federal court.
•nmental immunity.
emmental function.
le legislative delegation of certain
s and duties surely establishes that the
se and performance thereof is a govern1 function for purposes of a political subm's authority to operate, it does not autoilly follow that the function qualifies as a
•nmental function" for purposes of govmtal immunity analysis. Loveland v.
City Corp., 746 P.2d 763 (Utah 1987).
i homeowner's suit based on failure to
uct a fence around a canal adjacent to
>use, the city's procedure in review and
iral of the relevant subdivision plans did
institute a governmental function,
md v. Orem City Corp., 746 P.2d 763
1987).
al sued in representative capacity.
rovernmental official or employee can
e sued in a representative capacity when
overnmental entity is liable; commisof Department of Financial Institutions
not be sued in a representative capacity
the state was not liable. Madsen v.
ick. 658 P.2d 627 (Utah 1983).

—Applicability of section.
Where parents contended that they were not
subject to the 1978 amendment of this section
because their cause of action accrued at the
time they received and relied upon the negligent advice of the doctors in 1977 that they
could safely have another child, it was held
that the injury in a wrongful birth claim cannot precede the birth of the child, which was 10
months after the effective date of the 1978
amendment to this section. Since there was no
allegation of gross negligence, fraud, or malice
this section precluded the personal liability of
the doctors. Payne ex rel. Payne v. Myers, 743
P.2d 186 (Utah 1987).
The 1983 amendment of this section deleting
the provision making employees personally liable for gross negligence should be applied prospectively only. Madsen v. Borthick, 769 P.2d
245 (Utah 1988).
—Remedy for wrongful act.
The 1978 amendment to this section did not
leave the parents without a remedy for their
wrongful birth injury by granting immunity
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NOTES TO DECISIONS
Construction and application.
The waiver of immunity from suit "for the
recovery of any property real or personal or for
the possession thereof does not include an action for damages for impairment of access to
property caused by construction of highway

underpass; this act should be strictly construed
to preserve sovereign immunity and to waive it
only as clearly expressed therein. Holt v. Utah
State Rd. Comm., 30 Utah 2d 4, 511 P.2d 1286
(1973).

63-30-7, Waiver of immunity for injury from negligent oprf-^d //oo eration of motor vehicles — Exception.
Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is waived for injury resulting from the negligent operation by any employee of a motor vehicle or other
equipment during the performance of his duties, within the scope of employment, or under color of authority; provided, however, that this section shall
not apply to the operation of emergency vehicles as defined by law and while
being driven in accordance with the requirements of Section 41-6-14.
History: L. 1965, ch. 139, § 7; 1983, ch.
129, § 5.
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
A.L.R. — Admiralty jurisdiction: maritime
lature of tort — modern cases, 80 A.LJR. Fed.
L05.

53-30-8. Waiver of immunity for injury caused by defec'P.Jsi UZA tive, unsafe, or dangerous condition of highways,
bridges, or other structures.
Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is waived for any injury
aused by a defective, unsafe, or dangerous condition of any highway, road,
treet, alley, crosswalk, sidewalk, culvert, tunnel, bridge, viaduct or other
tructure located thereon.
History: L. 1965, ch. 139, § 8.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

ompiaint, sufficiency of allegations.
onstruction.
ontnbutory negligence.
angerous objects.
iscretionary function.
e and snow on sidewalk.
'anholes.
egligent construction.
ew duties not created.
ondelegable duty.
ivate developments.
*affic signs.

Complaint, sufficiency of allegations.
Claim for injuries "sustained on or about
January 15, 1902, while walking on the sidewalk along First West street between Seventh
and Eighth South, * * * through the negligence
of the city in suffering * * * a fence * * * to be
on said sidewalk," not having misled the city,
was sufficiently definite. Connor v. Salt Lake
City, 28 Utah 248, 78 P. 479 (1904).
Where plaintiff sustained damages to his automobile on city streets, and presented a claim
for "necessary repairs to automobile $133," he
cannot claim and recover additional damages
for $1,000 for its "depreciation in value and
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ot to private developments, such as an imgaon canal owned by a pnvate company,
oveland v. Orem City Corp., 746 P2d 763
Jtah 1987).
raffle signs.
The maintenance and repair of traffic signs

63-30-9

is a governmental function for which immunity from suit has been expressly waived and
which is not within the discretionary function
exception. Richards v. Leavitt, 716 P2d 276
(Utah 1985).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
A.L.R- — Highways: governmental duty to
•ovide curve warnings or markings, 57
.L.R.4th 342.
Governmental tort liability as to highway
edian barriers, 58 A.L.R.4th 559.
Governmental tort liability for injury to rolr skater allegedly caused by sidewalk or
reet defects, 58 A.L.R.4th 1197.

Legal aspects of speed bumps, 60 A.L.R.4th
1249.
Highway contractor's liability to highway
user for highway surface defects, 62 A.L.R.4th
1067.
State and local government liability for injury or death of bicyclist due to defect or obstruction in public bicycle path, 68 A.L R.4th
204.

3-30-9. Waiver of immunity for injury from dangerous or
'aci//ao defective public building, structure, or other
public improvement — Exception. ~7$o f-od XlQ?
Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is waived for any injury
Lused from a dangerous or defective condition of any public building, strucire, dam, reservoir or other public improvement. Immunity is not waived for
tent defective conditions.
History: L- 1965, ch. 139, § 9.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
one year) in § 63-30-13 is applicable to this
section. Parnsh v Layton City Corp , 542 P 2d
1086 (Utah 1975) (decided under former law).

ANALYSIS

tent defective condition.
>ghgent construction.
>tice to city.
usance action.
her public improvement.
ivate developments.
ted.
tent defective condition.
Defect in a county storm dram that was disrerable by a reasonable inspection was not a
ent defect. Vincent v. Salt Lake County, 583
Id 105 (Utah 1978).
gligent construction.
Vhere university construction diverted flow
surface water, flooding basement and caus\ other damage to adjoining landowner, govufcental immunity was waived and univerf was liable to landowner. Sanford v. Uni•sity of Utah, 26 Utah 2d 285, 488 P 2d 741
71).
tice to city.
Requirement that notice of claim be given to
itical subdivision within ninety days (now

Nuisance action.
Intent of legislature was to include within
the waiver of immunity an action for pnvate
nuisance in so far as the action is predicated on
a dangerous or defective condition of a public
improvement that unreasonably interferes
with the use and enjoyment of the claimant's
property. Sanford v. University of Utah, 26
Utah 2d 285, 488 P2d 741 (1971).
Other public improvement
Damages to house and basement partially
incurred from defective conditions of sewer
dram and canal fell under purview of this section. Parnsh v. Layton City Corp., 542 P2d
1086 (Utah 1975).
Private developments.
This section's waiver of immunity for mjunes caused by defective conditions applies only
with regard to conditions on property in the
public use, not on pnvate developments such
as an lingation canal owned by a pnvate com-

527

63-30-7

STATE AFFAIRS IN GENERAL

ment, was not engaged as a governmental entity in the "management of flood waters" so as
to be immune from suit. Branam v. Provo
School Dist, 780 P.2d 810 (Utah 1989).
School district was not shielded from possible liability for damages arisingfromits negli-

gence in the resurfacing of a school parking lot,
which resulted in surface water runoff on an
adjoining landowner's property. Williams v.
Carbon County Bd. of Educ, 780 P.2d 816
(Utah 1989).

63-30-7. Waiver of immunity for injury from negligent operation of motor vehicles — Exception.
(1) (a) Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is waived for injury
resultingfromthe negligent operation by any employee of a motor vehicle
or other equipment during the performance of his duties, within the scope
of employment, or under color of authority.
(b) This subsection does not apply to the operation of emergency vehicles as defined by law and while being driven in accordance with the
requirements of Section 41-6-14.
(2) (a) All governmental entities employing peace officers retain and do not
waive immunity from liability for civil damages for personal injury or
death or for damage to property resulting from the collision of a vehicle
being operated by an actual or suspected violator of the law who is being,
has been, or believes he is being or has been pursued by a peace officer
employed by the governmental entity in a motor vehicle.
(b) Enactment of this subsection does not state nor imply that this
immunity was ever previously waived or this liability specifically or implicitly recognized.
History: L. 1965, ch- 139, § 7; 1983, ch.
129, § 5; 1990, ch. 204, § 1.
Amendment Notes. — The 1990 amend-

ment, effective April 23, 1990, designated the
former section as Subsection (1); added Subsection (2); and made related stylistic changes.

63-30-9- Waiver of immunity for injury from dangerous or
defective public building, structure, or other
public improvement — Exception.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
Cited in Rocky Mt. Thrift Stores, Inc. v. Salt
Lake City Corp., 784 P.2d 459 (Utah 1989).

63-30-10. Waiver of immunity for injury caused by negligent act or omission of employee — Exceptions.
Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is waived for injury proximately caused by a negligent act or omission of an employee committed
within the scope of employment except if the injury arises out of:
(1) the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a
discretionary function, whether or not the discretion is abused;
(2) assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, malicious prosecution, intentional trespass, abuse of process, libel, slander, deceit, interference with contract rights, infliction of mental anguish, or civil rights;
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3) the issuance, denial, suspension, or revocation of or by the failure or
iisal to issue, deny, suspend, or revoke any permit, license, certificate,
proval, order, or similar authorization;
4) a failure to make an inspection or by making an inadequate or
gligent inspection of any property;
[5) the institution or prosecution of any judicial or administrative prodding, even if malicious or without probable cause;
;6) a misrepresentation by the employee whether or not it is negligent
intentional;
(7) or results from riots, unlawful assemblies, public demonstrations,
)b violence, and civil disturbances;
(8) or in connection with the collection of and assessment of taxes;
(9) the activities of the Utah National Guard;
(10) the incarceration of any person in any state prison, county or city
il, or other place of legal confinement;
(11) any natural condition on state lands or as the result of any activity
ithorized by the Board of State Lands and Forestry;
(12) research or implementation of cloud management or seeding for
ie clearing of fog; or
(13) the activities of:
(a) providing emergency medical assistance;
(b) fighting fire;
(c) regulating, mitigaung, or handling hazardous materials or hazardous wastes;
(d) emergency evacuations; or
(e) intervening during dam emergencies.
Dry: L. 1965, ch. 139, § 10; 1975, ch.
11; 1982, ch. 10, § 1; 1985, ch. 169, § 1;
:h. 185, § 1; 1989, ch. 187, § 3; 1989,
3, § 29; 1990, ch. 15, §§ 1, 2; 1990, ch.
\ 1, 2.
jndment Notes. — The 1990 amend\y ch. 15, effective July 1, 1990, deleted
!>8ection designation (1) from the beginf the section, redesignated former Subis (l)(a) to (1X1) as Subsections (1) to (13)
ade related changes, and deleted former

Subsection (2), waiving immunity from suit for
violation of Fourth Amendment rights and
making the provisions of Chapter 16 of Title 78
the exclusive remedy for injuries caused by
such violations.
The 1990 amendment by ch. 319, effective
July 1, 1990, added Subsection (13)(e) and
made a related stylistic change.
This section is set out as reconciled by the
(Mice of Legislative Research and General
Counsel.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Decisions regarding the design, capacity,
and construction of a flood control system were
discretionary functions. Rocky Mt. Thrift
Stores, Inc. v. Salt Lake City Corp., 784 P.2d
459 (Utah 1989).

tionary function.
ed prisoner.
«s.
etionary function.
iged negligent conduct of a county emj in operating a backhoe pursuant to a
ir program of dredging stream channels
ar away silt, gravel deposits, debris, and
matter which obstructed the flow of
• did not fall within the discretionary
ton exception of Subsection (1). Irvine v.
lake County, 785 P.2d 411 (Utah 1989).

Escaped prisoner.
Bailiffs action against state for gunshot
wound inflicted by a prisoner was properly dismissed, because either (1) the prisoner had
totally escaped the control of the officers escorting him and was thus acting on his own so
the officers were not responsible for him, or (2)
he was still under the control of the officers, in
which case the officers would be immune from
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